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1. Overview 
The International Linear Collider (ILC) is a unique endeavour in particle physics; fully 
international from the outset, it has no “host laboratory” to provide infrastructure and 
support. The realization of this project therefore presents unique challenges, in 
scientific, technical and political arenas. This document outlines the main questions that 
need to be answered if the ILC is to become a reality. It describes the methodology used 
to harness the wisdom displayed and lessons learned from current and previous large 
international projects. From this basis, it suggests both general principles and outlines a 
specific model to realize the ILC. It recognizes that there is no unique model for such a 
laboratory and that there are often several solutions to a particular problem. 
Nevertheless it proposes concrete solutions that the authors believe are currently the 
best choices in order to stimulate discussion and catalyze proposals as to how to bring 
the ILC project to fruition. The ILC Laboratory would be set up by international treaty 
and be governed by a strong Council to whom a Director General and an associated 
Directorate would report. Council would empower the Director General to give strong 
management to the project. It would take its decisions in a timely manner, giving 
appropriate weight to the financial contributions of the member states. The ILC 
Laboratory would be set up for a fixed term, capable of extension by agreement of all 
the partners. The construction of the machine would be based on a Work Breakdown 
Structure and value engineering and would have a common cash fund sufficiently large 
to allow the management flexibility to optimize the project’s construction. Appropriate 
contingency, clearly apportioned at both a national and global level, is essential if the 
project is to be realised. Finally, models for running costs and decommissioning at the 
conclusion of the ILC project are proposed. 
 
This document represents an interim report of the bodies and individuals studying these 
questions inside the structure set up and supervised by the International Committee for 
Future Accelerators (ICFA). It represents a request for comment to the international 
community in all relevant disciplines, scientific, technical and most importantly, 
political. Many areas require further study and some, in particular the site selection 
process, have not yet progressed sufficiently to be addressed in detail in this document. 
Discussion raised by this document will be vital in framing the final proposals due to be 
published in 2012 in the Technical Design Report being prepared by the Global Design 
Effort of the ILC.   
2. Introduction 
In the early 2000’s several study reports [1] were issued by Asian, European and 
American regional bodies, representing the relevant high-energy physics communities, 
on possible organisational structures for the project management of a Linear Collider 
(LC). The Consultative Group on High- Energy Physics of the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) also issued a report [2] on their 
consensus, concurrently with these regional reports. All reports agreed that a high-
energy electron-positron LC is the next major facility on the world high-energy physics 
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roadmap. Together, these reports laid the foundations for a world organisation for the 
design development of an LC, leading to establishment of the Global Design Effort 
(GDE) for the International Linear Collider. 
 
These regional and international reports systematically identified most of the 
organisational, legal, budgetary and political issues associated with the actual 
construction and management of the ILC project. The GDE is presently engaged in 
producing a Technical Design of the ILC Project before the end of 2012, when it will be 
presented to the community and interested government agencies.  Therefore, we aim to 
produce recommendations agreed by the international research community for the 
Organisation or Governance of the ILC Project on a similar timescale,. 
 
The purpose of this document, which we classify as a “request for comments” is to 
facilitate a structured discussion on these governance issues of the International Linear 
Collider in the construction and operation stage, by presenting a possible solution model 
and outlining other options, and by inviting inputs from the members of relevant 
international research communities. It should be emphasized that the solution presented 
below is not the only one possible; others could no doubt be made to work. 
Nevertheless, in the opinion of the study groups, it is the preferred option. 
 
Several key observations are worth noting at this point. 
 
a. Consensus-based Guidelines for Global Projects need to be developed – the community 
of high-energy physics, under ICFA, has developed “ICFA Guidelines for the 
Interregional Utilization of Major Regional Experimental Facilities for High-Energy 
Physics Research” [3], which have been successful as guidance for the execution of 
international research programs at large accelerator facilities. However, the ILC is 
likely to be outside the scope of the existing guidelines, since major portions of 
construction and operation budgets are expected to be internationally, rather than 
regionally or nationally, shared. 
 
Therefore, it is intended to annotate the present ICFA Guidelines by adding statements 
on “Global” projects, in which major parts of the construction and operation budgets are 
shared.  An attempt should be made to clarify the separation, connection and co-
existence between the ILC-like and non-ILC-like (and, consequently, more traditional) 
international projects. 
 
b. A Linear Collider will not be the only project to be pursued by the world high-energy 
physics community. Besides the LC, a strong need could emerge for new, next 
generation international accelerator facilities, which require existing laboratories to 
lead the related research, design and development efforts. Some such projects might be 
similar to the ILC in terms of the globally distributed nature of resources, and some 
may be more localized to specific regions. In both cases, the co-existence of individual 
institutions with the project and the sharing of local/regional personnel and facilities 
will require careful analysis.  Therefore, the ILC laboratory organisation will make 
provision for evolutionary and continuous involvement of existing national/regional 
research institutions.  
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c. The separation of technical/scientific and political aspects. Without doubt, the final 
negotiations and decisions concerning the legal agreements, budget sharing and site 
selection for the ILC will have to be made by the appropriate government agencies of 
the interested nations/regions. On the other hand, the technical context and resultant 
boundary conditions or specifications for the project (such as the base performance 
parameters or the technical specifications for possible sites) should be dictated by the 
scientific merits. This aspect should be insulated from political considerations. 
 
Therefore, it would be advantageous to identify “where the scientists end, and where the 
government officers and statesmen begin”, and develop our analysis accordingly. A 
notable example is the issue of site selection, where the critical requirement is that this 
process converges to a site truly suitable for construction and operation of the ILC from 
the technical and scientific viewpoints. Here, we propose that the members of the 
academic sector play leadership roles in defining the specifications, while the political 
sector makes the best executive judgment among the candidate sites that are known to 
satisfy the previously established technical specifications. We are continuing to study 
various examples of the site selection process, both in similar projects, such as the 
European Spallation Source (ESS) and ITER, which had a long and difficult site 
selection, as well as in other fields, such as the Olympic Games, where the process runs 
much more smoothly. 
 
We recommend that the International Linear Collider Steering Committee (ILCSC) 
leads the effort to establish such site-selection criteria. These site criteria and a 
subsequent validation process of prospective sites from the technical standpoint, will 
establish a set of site candidates all of which are verified as satisfying the scientific and 
technical site requirements for the ILC. Subsequent government-level negotiations of 
these "pre-validated" site candidates will result in a site that is technical suitable for the 
ILC. 
 
A large number of more technical issues, in particular intellectual property rights and 
ownership, are not addressed in this document but deferred until the final report. It 
should be noted that ITER has made an extensive study of IP issues that can serve as a 
reference for the ILC.  
 
In the following sections, more specific analyses and a possible organisational model 
for the ILC and its time-evolution are presented. 
3.ILC Governance 
3.1 Introduction The	  International	  Linear	  Collider	  (ILC)	  is	  in	  many	  ways	  a	  unique	  project,	  certainly	  in	  particle	  physics.	  It	  is	  the	  first	  accelerator	  to	  be	  proposed	  on	  a	  truly	  international	  basis,	   having	   no	   initial	   major	   “host”	   laboratory	   in	   which	   the	   project	   could	   be	  incubated.	   It	   was	   set	   up	   from	   the	   outset	   in	   a	   fully	   international	   way	   with	   all	  countries	  and	  regions	  on	  an	  equal	  basis.	  The	  construction	  of	  the	  ILC	  will	  require	  a	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major	   political	   effort	   from	   governments	   around	   the	   world;	   its	   governance	   will	  necessarily	  be	  complex	  and	  requires	  a	  consensus	  across	  different	  national	  systems	  and	  traditions	  that	  will	  not	  be	  easy	  to	  forge.	  This	  section	  is	  an	  interim	  report	  of	  an	  effort	   inside	   the	  Global	  Design	  Effort	   of	   the	   ILC.	   It	   attempts	   to	   clarify	   issues	   and	  recommend	  possible	  ways	  forward.	  Its	  aim	  is	  to	  help	  governments	  to	  identify	  the	  major	   issues	   that	  must	  be	  addressed	   if	   an	   ILC	   laboratory	   is	   to	  be	   fit	   for	  purpose	  and	  capable	  of	  both	  building	  the	  accelerator	  and	  carrying	  out	  the	  exciting	  physics	  programme	  of	   the	   ILC.	   	  The	   ILC	  organisation	  proposed	   is	   limited	   to	  building	  and	  carrying	   out	   the	   physics	   programme	   of	   the	   ILC	   and	   will	   be	   dissolved	   when	   its	  mission	  is	  completed.	  
3.2 Working methods Although	   the	   ILC	   is	  unprecedented	   in	  particle	  physics,	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  experience	  has	  been	  built	  up	  on	  the	  governance	  of	  other	  projects	  of	  substantial	  size	  and	  wide	  international	   involvement.	   However,	   perhaps	   only	   ITER	   is	   really	   comparable	   in	  both	  these	  aspects	  and	  even	  then	  there	  are	  substantial	  differences.	  This	  means	  that	  it	   is	   impossible	   simply	   to	   take	   over	  wholesale	   prescriptions	   that	  worked	  well	   in	  previous	   particle	   physics	   projects	   or	   in	   the	   current	   generation	   of	   large	  international	   facilities.	   This	   does	   not	   imply	   that	   lessons	   cannot	   be	   learnt	   from	  them;	   on	   the	   contrary,	   the	   approach	   of	   the	   authors	   has	   been	   systematically	   to	  investigate	   the	  Governance	   arrangements	   for	  many	   international	   projects	   and	   to	  organise	  the	  data	  obtained	  into	  a	  series	  of	  pro	  formas.	  By	  distilling	  the	  information	  into	  common	  headings,	  useful	  comparisons	  could	  be	  made	  and	   lessons	  drawn.	   In	  addition	  to	  reading	  the	  proposal	  and	  other	  documents	  produced	  by	  these	  projects,	  several	  meetings	  and	  discussions	  have	  been	  held	  with	  senior	  members	  of	  many	  of	  the	  projects,	  in	  which	  experience	  and	  ideas	  have	  been	  exchanged	  and	  refined.	  	  
 The	   projects	   that	   have	   been	   investigated	   are:	   ALMA;	   ESS;	   FAIR;	   ITER;	   SKA	   and	  XFEL.	  	  Both	  ESS	  and	  SKA	  are	  at	  an	  early	  stage	  of	  development	  and	  therefore	  do	  not	  necessarily	  have	   fixed	  proposals	   for	  governance;	  nevertheless	  we	  have	  examined	  and	  discussed	  what	  is	  available	  and	  incorporated	  it	  into	  our	  considerations	  where	  appropriate.	   There	   are	   many	   similarities	   between	   FAIR	   and	   XFEL;	   we	   have	  concentrated	  on	  the	  proposals	  for	  XFEL	  but	  where	  FAIR	  has	  differing	  features	  they	  have	  been	  taken	  explicitly	  into	  consideration.	  	  
 The	  information	  on	  the	  projects	  was	  organised	  wherever	  possible	  into	  a	  common	  format	  in	  pro	  formas.	  The	  headings	  under	  which	  information	  was	  organised	  were:	  	  
 a. Legal	  Status	  	  b. Management	  Structure	  c. Representation	  and	  voting	  structure	  in	  governing	  body	  d. Duration	  of	  agreement	  e. Attribution	  of	  in-­‐kind	  contributions,	  value	  engineering,	  etc.	  f. Running	  costs	  &	  decommissioning	  g. Budgetary	  control	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The	   pro	   formas	   were	   discussed	   and	   evaluated	   in	   several	   meetings	   of	   the	   ILC	  working	   groups	   in	   order	   to	   reach	   a	   series	   of	   recommendations	   for	   each	   of	   the	  sections	   of	   the	   pro	   formas.	   These	   are	   outlined	   below,	   where	   bold	   sections	  represent	  the	  recommendations	  and	  the	  italic	  text	  below	  is	  a	  commentary	  on	  that	  recommendation,	  adducing	  reasons	  and	  observations	  on	  the	  conclusion.	  It	  should	  be	   emphasized	   that,	  while	   there	  were	   often	   strong	   reasons	   to	   reach	   a	   particular	  recommendation,	  there	  were	  also	  sometimes	  several	  possible	  conclusions	  with	  no	  strong	  preference	  for	  any	  particular	  one;	  the	  recommendation	  of	  a	  particular	  path	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  other	  choices	  would	  not	  work.	  	  	  
4. Recommendations 
4.1 Legal Status 
ILC should be set up as an international treaty organisation similar to ITER, 
taking advantage of zero VAT rating and similar privileges.  
 
Projects examined include three currently utilized models for legal status: no legal 
entity, limited company and treaty organisation. The group strongly recommends that 
ILC must have its own legal identity. Experience from XFEL and FAIR implies that the 
foundation of a limited-liability company is no easier, quicker or less complex than a 
treaty organisation. A treaty organisation with a finite duration is stronger and more 
flexible than a limited company. A vitally important part of the treaty is to guarantee 
access to the ILC laboratory to all interested parties. The circumstances of the US with 
regard to treaties can be accommodated by the same arrangement as used for ITER. 
Participation of individual countries in the ILC can be through regional organisations, 
e.g. CERN, and use can be made of existing research infrastructure frameworks, e.g. 
ERIC in the European Union, where appropriate.  While preferring a treaty, both that 
and a limited company could be made to work.  
4.2 Management Structure 
ILC should have a strong Council as the ultimate governance body. Council 
delegates should be of sufficient standing to make decisions in a timely fashion. 
The ILC should have a Director General and a Directorate, proposed for Council 
ratification by the DG. The DG should have significant delegated authority from 
the Council, allowing him or her to act decisively without continual need to refer 
back to Council. 
 
All projects examined have Councils representing the member states; some are stronger 
than others. Council should meet at least twice a year. It is essential that a DG should 
be appointed in whom Council has confidence and whom it trusts to manage the 
laboratory and project. He or she must have suitable delegated authority to keep the 
project on track. The level of delegated authority in, for example, ITER does not seem to 
us sufficient to manage the project optimally.  
P
oS(ICHEP 2010)516
ILC Governance B. Foster 
 
     8 
 
 
4.3 Representation and voting structure in governing body 
Each Council member state1 should have 2 official delegates and a maximum of 2 
advisors. One of the two delegates should be a particle physicist. There should be 
the option, every few years, of Ministerial Council Meetings in which delegates are 
the relevant government minister.  
 
Council should decide questions not of a financial nature by simple majority; 
financial questions should be decided by a qualified majority voting decided by a 
majority of financial contributions plus a majority of individual member states. 
 
It seems important to keep the numbers attending Council meetings as small as 
possible, consistent with ensuring that each member state has a delegate representing 
the government and another to give a scientific perspective on the work of the ILC 
laboratory. This recommendation is again modelled on the CERN experience. CERN 
Council does not explicitly have Ministerial sessions in contrast to e.g. ESA. 
Appropriate Ministerial involvement with the organisation is important when major 
strategic decisions are required. The option of having such meetings on a regular basis 
is important.  
 
Most of the projects examined have a weighted voting system, with a tendency to reach 
decisions by requiring a higher weight of financial contributions than required at the 
CERN Finance Committee. It is unnecessary to specify the details of the voting system 
here but the pattern of a majority of financial contributions and/or a majority of 
members seems a good one.  
4.4 Duration of ILC agreement 
The ILC agreement should be fixed term – a construction period of ~9 years plus 
20 years of operation; it should be extendable by agreement of Council in periods 
of 5 years. Withdrawal would not be allowed until a minimum of 10 years after the 
agreement comes into force and then only after 1 full year after notice of 
withdrawal. 
 
All projects have a fixed term which can be extended after agreement by all members. 
The construction period represents the current best guess from the ILC Civil 
Construction experts including necessary initial tool-up time after the construction 
agreement is signed. The physics programme of the ILC would extend over at least 20 
years and would include an energy upgrade to 1 TeV as well as possible technology 
changes to reach even higher energies. It is essential for international organisations to 
have stability of membership in order to plan sensibly; hence withdrawal should be 
inhibited by considerable barriers.   
 
 
 
                                                
1  The definition of a “member state” should be as flexible as possible and include groupings of nations 
represented by a coordinating body, for example CERN or JINR. 
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4.5 Attribution of in-kind contributions, value engineering, etc.  
The ILC construction project should be based on a Work Breakdown Structure 
(WBS) system. In-kind contributions will be likely to form the majority of 
contributions to the project’s infrastructure. An agreed register of WBS items 
should be set up and a committee constituted to consider bids for WBS items from 
member states. Value engineering should be used in defining the “value” of each 
WBS item.  There should be an adequate Common Fund (of at least 20%) in order 
to give management enough flexibility. There should be no strict “juste retour”.   
 
Use of WBS is now standard in all major projects, as is value engineering, which is 
used to optimise the performance/cost ratio and thereby determine the size of financial 
contributions attributed to WBS items. The value estimate must be based on the close-
to-final design and the industrial procurement model, including the likely number of 
qualified vendors. The committee to adjudicate award of WBS items will need optimally 
to match the expertise and track-record of the bidding manufacturer, the financial 
contribution of the member state and the requirements of the project. While “juste 
retour” would ensure that all member states get a return of funding to their industries 
proportional to their input, this is not recommended as it tends to increase the cost of 
the project and can also result in the project being unable to select the best vendor for 
the job. It is vital that the project has a sufficiently large Common Fund so that the 
management can react to problems in a flexible way and allocate additional resources 
to time-critical areas of the project. Experience from for example ITER implies that a 
Common Fund larger than the 12% allocated for ITER is required. We believe that 20% 
is a reasonable minimum Common Fund of a project of the size and complexity of the 
ILC. If the Common Fund is too small, schedule slippage and concomitant cost 
increases and inefficiency are highly likely.  
4.6 Contingency 
If and when needed, the Council should have the authority to call on a central 
contingency budget with a maximum of 10% of the total project cost and to 
allocate it as appropriate. Increases in costs to produce a WBS item smaller than 
25% or some other agreed ceiling in cash should be borne by the country with 
responsibility for that item; they are recommended to have appropriate internal 
contingency. It is important to avoid double counting between the central 
contingency and a country’s internal contingency in arriving at the overall project 
costing. If costs for a WBS item increase beyond the agreed ceiling, the case could 
be referred to and considered by a standing Board and either referred back to the 
submitting country or referred to Council for release of central contingency, as 
appropriate.  
 
Exhaustion of the central contingency should lead to appropriate descoping of the 
project to be decided by management with Council’s agreement.  
 
Generally speaking, the provision of in-kind contributions carries with it a 
responsibility for the contracting member state to bear any cost overruns incurred in 
providing the WBS item. However, it is likely that some items may well incur cost 
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increases because of factors beyond the control of the provider, or involving some other 
exceptional factor. An example would be if the growth in cost were substantially related 
to design changes in other areas of the project. Experience with other projects teaches 
that it is necessary to deal flexibly with increases in cost for particular WBS items. The 
expectation should be that countries assigned a WBS item should normally be 
responsible for any cost increases incurred in providing it; however, it is necessary to 
recognize that there may be exceptional circumstances where this is not appropriate 
and to put in place mechanisms to adjudicate such cases. The size of the central 
contingency proposed is in line with that adopted by other large projects.  
 
Recent experience in budgetary growth for large international projects has not been 
encouraging. In order to reassure governments that the ILC project, once approved, 
will not spiral into major cost overruns, we believe that it is necessary to give 
assurances that descoping the project is possible in order to contain costs if this is the 
decision of the ILC Council. The ILC, being highly modular, can be descoped in a way 
which is not straight-forward for a project such as for example ITER. The most obvious 
method of descoping is to reduce the energy reach of the machine by installing fewer 
superconducting cavities.   
4.7 Running costs and decommissioning 
Running costs should be evaluated at the time of setting up the organisation and a 
suitable algorithm agreed to. A commonly chosen algorithm is that running costs 
should be distributed roughly proportional to capital contributions.  
 
Decommissioning should be the responsibility of the state that provided that WBS 
item; the Host State should have residual responsibility. 
 
Both of these recommendations follow common practice of most of the projects that we 
have examined. 
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